Abstract -This article assesses the possible impact of the Care Act 2014 on the provision of social care for elderly and disabled adults in England, focusing particularly on the balance between ensuring adequate care and affecting the property rights of the recipients of social care, their families, and others who might have legal or moral claims to their property (especially via inheritance). The article uses the European Convention on Human Rights to measure the Act's implications, arguing that normative problems remain despite the Act's general compatibility with the Convention.
Introduction
The legislation that became the Care Act 2014 was described as 'the biggest change in the law governing…care and support in England since the National Assistance Act 1948', 1 and it was sufficiently contentious for the Labour opposition to try to stop the relevant Bill from receiving a second reading in Parliament due to its alleged inadequacy. 2 This article's aim is to assess the likely impact of the Act (specifically Part 1) on the provision of social care for the increasing numbers of Final Version to be published in (2016) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.
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The Provision of Social Care
A. The Mechanics of the Care Act
Adult social care is the responsibility of LAs in England, though 'few…are now involved in the direct delivery of care and support services', with most services operated by private, for-profit providers. 19 It is distinct from health care provided by the National Health Service, and it will be seen in the next section that this distinction assumes particular importance as regards the funding of care. It is frequently criticised, and Herring asserts that 'whether the ability to care [for oneself] is seen as an aspect of health promotion or dealing with the consequences of ill-health, the distinction [between free health care and potentially charged-for social care] is hard to justify', and has suggested that 'the division has more to do with attempts to cut costs to the state, while holding on to the claim that health services are provided free at the point of delivery, than…being based on…sound policy '. 20 In any case, the NHS operates via the Secretary of State's duty to 'continue the promotion in
England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement' 21 'in the physical and mental health of the people of England' 22 and 'in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of physical and mental illness'. 23 There is no equivalent statutory definition of social care in 
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6 legislation, 24 although it has been said that it 'supports people of all ages with certain physical, cognitive or age-related conditions in carrying out personal care or domestic routines '. 25 It is also significant that the NHS mostly owes duties to the population as a whole, whereas
LAs owe some enforceable public law duties to individuals. 26 In essence, the National Health
Service Act 2006 imposes a duty on a clinical commissioning group to provide health care services to patients to such extent as it considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements.
27
According to the Government, ' [t]he Care Act and supporting guidance does not seek to alter the boundary of responsibilities of [LAs] and the NHS', 28 despite the Act's emphasis on integration. 29 Section 22 of the 2014 Act largely codifies the approach of the courts in interpreting the old boundary, 30 as well as giving the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to close the gap between health and social care. An LA may not 'meet needs…by providing or arranging for the provision of a service or facility that is required to be provided under' 31 the 2006 Act, unless 24 See, eg, Herring (n 7) 136-138. 25 Commission on Funding of Care and Support, (n 8) 4. (Toulson LJ). 28 
Department of Health, Response to the Consultation on Draft Regulations and Guidance for Implementation of Part 1
promote that individual's well-being', 47 with 'well-being' defined as encompassing several elements 48 and a number of matters being specified as mandatory relevant considerations. 49 While the principle is laudable, the Government has admitted that it is 'designed to set out the overarching purpose of care and support into which specific duties…fit, rather than require a [n] [LA] to undertake any particular action in…itself'. 50 It is, however, intended to signify 'a shift from… duties…to provide particular services, to the concept of "meeting needs"'. 51 Both the Law Commission 52 and Spencer-Lane 53 compare the well-being principle to the governing welfare principle in the Children Act 1989. 54 But the welfare principle is more mandatory in nature because welfare must be a court's 'paramount' consideration where it applies. Slasberg and Beresford criticize the absence of a standard of well-being in the Care Act's principle, 55 and the final statutory guidance crucially states that '[t]he Care Act's approach to "meeting needs", as opposed to duties to provide…services, is not intended to place additional requirements on [LAs]'. 56 One judge confirmed that the section 1 duty 'is worked out in many particular respects and most of them, …when properly understood, accord a large measure of discretion to the [LA]'. 57 47 Care Act 2014, s 1(1). 48 Care Act 2014, s 1(2). 49 Care Act 2014, s1(3). 50 Department of Health (n 28) 11. 51 Department of Health (n 29) paras 1-9, 10.10. 52 Law Commission (n 7) para 4.1. 53 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-003. 54 Children Act 1989, s 1. 55 C Slasberg and P Beresford, 'Government Guidance for the Care Act: Undermining Ambitions for Change? ' (2014) 10 Disability & Society 1677, 1677-8. 56 Department of Health (n 29) para 23.16.
R (on the application of SG) v Haringey LBC [2015] EWHC 2579 (Admin) [23] (Deputy Judge John Bowers QC).
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Many of the details of what the Act introduces are contained in regulations. This arguably makes the provisions more obscure and less accessible than they would be if they were in the Act itself. It should be noted, however, that previously most details about assessment were in mere guidance. 58 The same is true of eligibility for non-residential care under the old system, 59 and charging for non-residential services. 60 So there has in fact been an 'upgrade' in the authority of provisions governing some matters, which could be a positive development for the rule of law. 
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that it 'may in practice run parallel to the needs assessment', but is adamant that 'it must never influence an assessment of needs'.
69
A focus on continual assessment (without necessarily meeting needs) has been criticized.
70
The Law Commission recommended a two-tier approach, the first of which involves the LA providing information advice and assistance without assessment. 71 This is reflected in the distinction between sections 2-6 and 9-13. Cambridgeshire County Council, it was held that resources were irrelevant to the assessment of needs but relevant to whether it was necessary for the LA to provide a service, the nature and extent 69 Department of Health (n 29) para 6.12.
70 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-093. 71 Law Commission (n 7) paras 5.3-5.16.
72 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-093. 73 ibid para 1-099. 74 ibid para 1-100. 75 ibid para 1-100. nominally sets the same local threshold based on national guidance'. 91 Moreover, the Government's intention (and Slasberg and Beresford's prediction) 92 is that the threshold will replicate pre-existing practice, which continues discrimination based upon area of residence and limits the Act's impact.
The intention behind the draft regulations for the Care Act was to replicate the pre-Act 'substantial' needs threshold. 93 That threshold was contained in mere statutory guidance (at least in respect of non-residential care), 94 the Fair Access to Care Services ('FACS') guidance. 95 The FACS guidance contains four bands of needs -'critical', 'substantial', 'moderate' and 'low' -used by LAs to specify which level they would meet, taking account of their resources and other factors. 88 Law Commission (n 7) para 6.17.
89 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-149. 90 ibid para 1-149. felt the…regulations would make more people eligible than is currently the case, and thus increase costs'. 96 The requirement for two or more relevant 'inabilities' (discussed immediately below) was apparently added to the regulations after the consultation, and empirical evidence suggests that the Government has been essentially successful in its replication aims.
97
In order to fall within the national eligibility threshold, there are three cumulative conditions in the Regulations. 98 The first is that the adult's needs arise from or are related to a physical or mental impairment or illness. Rather mysteriously, the new guidance specifies that the LA must be satisfied that the needs are not caused by 'other circumstantial factors', 99 while providing that a formal diagnosis should be unnecessary. Perhaps the reference to such factors excludes needs generated by excessive working hours or similar. Spencer-Lane feared that the original wording 'due to a physical or mental impairment or illness' (emphasis added) imported a medical test, risked excluding drug and alcohol addicts, and contradicted the Law Commission's view that there should be no medical-legal categorisation. 100 But the final wording may be looser.
The second requirement is that as a result of the needs, the adult is unable to achieve two or more specified outcomes. This effectively imposes a de minimis threshold that might be useful, and few people with real need would be unable to achieve only one of the outcomes in the relevant sense. But the multiplicity requirement undermines the importance of each individual outcome. An inability for the purposes of the Regulations means 101 that the adult is unable to achieve the The final requirement for eligibility is that as a result of being unable to achieve the outcomes, there is, or is likely to be, a significant impact on the adult's well-being, 106 as defined within the well-being principle. 107 The LA will examine the cumulative effect of being unable to perform the relevant tasks. 'Significant' is left undefined in the Regulations, but 'well-being' seems to be at least partially subjective.
108
16
When making an eligibility determination, the LA must do so without taking account of the fact that needs are being met by an informal carer. 109 The Act creates 'the first ever entitlement to support for carers', 110 and the Impact Assessment expects this to be the main cost of implementing Part 1. 111 Previously, there was no duty to provide services or apply an eligibility framework for carers, 112 and the Department of Health's guidance on the matter was non-statutory. 113 Carers' own eligibility for care and support, which is independent to the eligibility of the care recipient, will also be governed by the Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations. The criteria are in some respects similar to those applied to a care recipient, 114 although carers are at a two-fold advantage.
They face fewer formal hurdles in demonstrating eligible needs (albeit that the substantive criteria may be harder to satisfy in particular circumstances) and they are less likely to be charged for support services. But this reflects the fact that, as the Government recognizes, 115 the LA may experience a net gain if it provides a service to a carer rather than providing caring services itself to the person whom the carer had previously been looking after. There are also circumstances in which a service providing respite for a carer will be charged to the adult who directly receives the service.
116
When it has assessed an adult who appears to require care and support, an LA must meet eligible needs even where the adult's assets exceed the threshold at which she would be expected to In spite of its general insistence that the Act largely replicates current practice, the Government has admitted that it 'is critical to the successful implementation of the…Act that [LAs] are…able to plan effectively for the changes required, and that funds be made available to deliver those changes within a constrained financial environment'. 126 The Government tried to head off concerns that LAs would not be able to implement the reforms, or that there were problems with the new right of 'self-funders' (in the latter case arguing that the Act merely extended the right in 117 Care Act 2014, s.18; see also s 15 on the cap. 120 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-237. 121 Care Act 2014, s 18(1)(a); s 18(5)(a). 122 Care Act 2014, s 18(3)(b). 123 Care Act 2014, s 18(7). 124 Care Act 2014, s 18(4).
125 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-233. 126 Department of Health (n 28) 5.
relation to non-residential care to cover residential care), 127 but it was later forced to delay the implementation of the new right relating to residential care until April 2020 alongside the cap.
128
As regards the care plan detailing how needs are to be met, the new focus away from merely providing services is relevant. The Government disagreed with the Law Commission's recommendation 129 that the content of the plan should be set out in regulations, preferring that a few high-level items be set out in the Act itself. 130 This may expand the ability to challenge the legal validity of such plans.
131
There is much emphasis in the guidance on involvement of the adult concerned. But as Slasberg and Beresford highlight, the final say about what a person's needs are and how they should be met will remain with the LA, 132 which is not necessarily consistent with a rights-based approach.
The plan is subject to a 'reasonableness' standard 133 and, in something of a contrast to the duty to meet eligible needs, resource considerations are relevant to how needs are to be met, 134 even if the statutory guidance specifies that 'the [LA] should not set arbitrary upper limits on the costs it is willing to pay to meet needs' 135 and 'there should be no constraint on how the needs are met as long as this is reasonable'.
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The overall result of the Care Act's approach to social care, on Slasberg and Beresford's analysis, is 'a circular process…whereby "need" is defined by resource availability' even given doubts about the relevance of resources to the needs assessment, 137 with potential political advantages. It can certainly be said that the Act provides a clearer statutory footing for adult social care, but it is much less clear that this will have a significant impact on the nature and extent of care being provided in particular cases.
B. Human Rights Arguments
It is now necessary to turn to the compatibility of both the old and the new social care system with the ECHR, particularly as regards whether they provide(d) a sufficient standard of care to particular individuals. It must first be noted, however, that the use of the ECHR (ostensibly concerned with civil and political rights) to protect social and economic rights is controversial. 139 See, eg, Murphy (n 9) 117-123 for a general discussion of the financial costs of human rights.
140 J King, Judging Social Rights (CUP 2012) 29.
141 Murphy (n 9) 47 (footnotes omitted).
Final Version to be published in (2016) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.
20
'unsatisfactory' or 'unappealing and unwelcome'. 142 She still maintains that the case law (along with the actions of other bodies) 'has disrupted an array of long-standing assumptions about health rights and…health rights justiciability', such that 'we can now have scrutiny and comparison vis-à-vis both…existing forms of justiciability and the effects of other rights…on health and health care'.
143
For its own part, the ECtHR has said that 'the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against [that] interpretation', and 'there is no water-tight division separating that sphere from…civil and political rights'. 144 The most relevant Convention provision for present purposes is likely to be Article 8 145 and its protection of the 'right to respect for private and family life'. 146 The
ECtHR has held that 'private life' in Article 8 'is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, a person's physical and psychological integrity…; the right to "personal development"…; and the notion of personal autonomy'.
147
A public authority is nevertheless able to justify the limitation of an Article 8 right using 153 was for assistance to reach a commode, but it then proposed that she used incontinence pads and absorbent bedding (even though she was not incontinent), which would eliminate the need for the carer and save the authority around £22,000.
She was informed of the decision to reduce her care before several reviews of her care plan, which effectively changed the assessment of her needs and concluded that the use of pads was a practical 183 ibid [63] .
184 Spencer-Lane illustrates the confusion about the distinction between assessing needs and eligibility using McDonald as regards the original needs assessment: Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-100. 185 Carr is apparently referring to the Equality Act 2010.
186 Carr (n 11) 223.
187 ibid.
188 Pritchard-Jones (n 12) 110.
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Clough and Brazier highlight the focus in the jurisprudence on procedural factors in the allocation of resources rather than the substantive scope of such decisions. 189 That is evident in
McDonald given the LA's ability to render its actions compliant with the ECHR by reviewing Ms
McDonald's care plan in consultation with her and her partner. 190 Clough and Brazier link the Care Act's well-being principle to the protection of human rights. 191 That said, they also acknowledge the limitations of simply stating human rights, advocating a more relational and contextual approach, 192 and it could be argued that the somewhat paternalistic concept of well-being sits uneasily with that of rights.
For the moment, the utility of the ECHR in measuring or ensuring the adequacy of care provision under either the old or the new law is limited, and it would be unrealistic to suggest that a 
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The next section of the article specifically considers the funding of social care under the Care Act, before considering its implications from a policy and human rights perspective within that realm.
The Funding of Social Care
A. The Care Act's Reforms
The funding of social care is a contentious issue, and one purpose of the Care Act is to reduce the controversy and the burden surrounding it for care recipients. It is significant, however, that no funding reform clauses were included in the draft Care and Support Bill. 
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29 their needs and income'. 200 It is also significant that, unlike the NHS budget, the adult social care budget is not ring-fenced.
201
The starkness of the funding differences is not, however, reflected in the distinction between the types of care, which has been discussed in the previous section of the article. Spencer-Lane points to an example whereby health and social care can be provided by the same piece of equipment, which could create a funding problem. 202 There is also controversy over NHS 201 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-039. 202 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-268. 
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LAs are already struggling to meet demands. Even so, the King's Fund assert that pressures in health and social care and the needs of an ageing population 'call for a response that goes well beyond patching up existing services and making the changes set out in the Dilnot report'. 207 They make the bold claim that 'higher public spending on health and social care is affordable if it is phased in over a decade' and recommend that it be funded 'through tax and national insurance increases, reallocating funds from other areas of spending, and changes to prescription charges'.
208
For the time being, however, the marked distinction between the funding arrangements for health and social care looks set to stay. It is notable that the relevant Minister in the House of Commons expressed a determination to achieve free social care at the end of life, which could be provided for by regulation, but refused to commit the Government. 209 One's view on such matters will depend upon one's position on the political spectrum, even if there must surely come a point where the need to protect human dignity transcends political and other differences.
210
The charging and funding regime in the Care Act is nevertheless 'intended to make charging fairer and more clearly understood by everyone'. 211 Hopkins and Laurie describe it as 'a significant ending several months before the delay in its implementation was announced, and those
Regulations would need to be amended and supplemented before it could be introduced. 214 Under the regime that would be introduced by via the Care Act, based somewhat on the Dilnot Commission's proposals but also delayed by the Government until 2020, people with assets of £118,000 (where the person's home is included in the financial assessment; the figure is £27,000
otherwise) 215 will start to receive help with care costs if they need to go into a care home.
216
£17,000 would have been the new lower limit of the means test below which no contribution will be expected from the individual, 217 increased from £14,250.
218
It has been seen that the LA's obligation to assess needs applies irrespective of the adult's resources, and that the needs assessment will begin progress towards the new cap on lifetime care
costs that an individual will have to bear. The cap was a central aspect of the Dilnot proposals and the Act. 219 It was expected to be £72,000 for those developing eligible care needs after the age of 25
if it was first introduced in April 2016, 220 and it will be adjusted annually to account for inflation. 221 The Act places an LA under a duty to keep a 'care account' to measure progress towards the cap. 226 Department of Health (n 29) para 11-10. 227 Care Act 2014, s 29.
228 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-331. 229 Care Act 2014, s 16(2). although the Impact Assessment suggests that this will be removed and replaced with a discretion if the funding reforms come fully into effect. 240 Local authorities will have quite some discretion concerning disregards, maximum charges etc., but the guidance urges them to exercise it consistently with reference to a developed policy. 241 The Regulations appear similar to the old National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations. 242 But it is significant and arguably beneficial to the rule of law and accessibility that non-residential care is also now subject to regulations rather than mere guidance, and the Impact Assessment notes that the Government has taken the 'opportunity to make some minor adjustments' even if those changes 'are designed to be cost neutral'.
243
The Regulations and guidance do not define 'capital' exhaustively, but the term generally 'refers to financial resources available for use and tends to be from sources…more durable than money in the sense that they can generate a return'. 244 The value of capital is reduced to account for selling expenses, and by the amount of outstanding debts secured on the asset. 245 Capital that is not immediately realisable is still included. 246 A person is assessed on the basis of her actual and notional capital, which includes capital that would be available to the person if she applied for it, is paid to a third party in respect of a person, or the person has deliberately deprived herself of it to reduce liability. 247 The value of notional capital is reduced by the difference between the weekly amount the person pays and the amount she would pay if the notional capital did not apply.
A number of assets are disregarded for the purposes of assessing capital. 248 Outside a care home context, assessment must exclude the adult's main or only home. 249 Even if the person is in a care home, there is a disregard if the person is there temporarily and intends to return to the main home or is taking reasonable steps to dispose of it, or the main home is occupied by a non-estranged partner, a single parent who is an estranged partner, a relative aged 60 or over or under 18, or who is incapacitated. 250 There is a discretion to disregard the home in other circumstances, including where a relative moves into the property after the adult moves into a care home, 251 but it should be 244 Department of Health (n 29) Annex B, para 5. There is also a 12-week disregard of the value of a property when the adult first enters a care home or another disregard ends unexpectedly because a qualifying relative dies or goes into a care home himself. 252 There is a discretion in relation to other unexpected changes of circumstance.
253
There are also additional temporary disregards in relation to certain types of property. 254 Where a person has relevant assets between the lower and upper limit, the LA assumes that for every £250 of capital (or part thereof), the person can contribute £1 per week towards care costs.
This is known as 'tariff income'. 255 As regards income, it is significant that income from current employment 256 and selfemployment is disregarded, and that these are widely interpreted. 257 Most income from annuities, 
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'forced', and pointed to the possible advantages of doing so. 278 In any case, Spencer-Lane notes several weaknesses in the old DPA scheme. 279 There was no obligation on LAs to offer them, and the Impact Assessment for the Act reported a 'wide variation in both the number of [DPAs] offered …and…the eligibility conditions attached', such that only around 4,000 people entered them each year. 280 In addition, LAs were not able to charge interest until after the person died, and preferred to use their general debt recovery powers because those allowed a charge to be placed on the home without consent.
281
The Government reported that '[t]he majority of respondents were highly supportive of the overall intention to extend the deferred payments scheme'. 282 There are nevertheless still concerns that the asset threshold for the mandatory offering of a DPA (effectively £23,250 in the first instance) and the apparent likelihood that only people with slightly more than that would be offered one on a discretionary basis effectively prevent the scheme from being universal, although the asset threshold could change. The Impact Assessment confirms that 'self-funders would not be eligible for a deferred payment if they had more than £23,500 [sic] in savings'. 283 While it justifies this on the basis that '[a]nyone above this threshold could…afford to pay for a year of…care out of their savings, without having to draw on their housing wealth', 284 there remains a significant limitation. 285 The Impact Assessment also makes clear that '[LAs] will be required to seek adequate security' for a DPA, 286 and can refuse to enter an agreement with someone who meets the general mandatory criteria if they are unable to obtain a first charge over the person's property. 287 The statutory guidance provides that the authority must also seek consent from anyone with a beneficial interest in the property. 288 The guidance was amended inter alia to ensure that LAs 'signpost' people to independent financial advice (including regulated financial advice but where appropriate before taking out a DPA. 289 The facilitation of access to independent financial advice is included within an LA's information and advice-related obligations under section 4 of the Act, though there are concerns that the advice-related duty is general and does not seek to ensure that advice is received and understood. 290 LAs' powers to recover debts have at least been reformed with the aim of providing greater protection to individuals, 291 but a DPA remains potentially prejudicial to the heirs of care recipients.
The Government hoped that a market in insurance products would develop once the cap comes into effect, to help people pay for care. 292 The King's Fund, however, claims that there are 'no signs' that such a market will develop. 293 297 It has nevertheless been seen that the Government has sought to minimize the impact of the reforms in some respects. Conversely, £470
million was announced for 2015-16 to cover the specific implementation of new duties and also to prepare for the expected further reforms in 2016-17.
298
The next sub-section considers human rights and policy arguments surrounding the Act's funding reforms in greater depth. Final Version to be published in (2016) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.
B. Human Rights and Policy Arguments
The ECHR protects the property interests of individuals via Article 1 of its First Protocol, 299 although there is an overlap between funding and the Article 8 issues considered in the previous section of this article. 300 Article 8's distinctive protection for the 'home' might also be relevant, but it is 'doubtful' for these purposes that the necessary link is present for the care recipient herself (as distinct from an informal carer living in the same home) without 'an intention to return to the home following a move into permanent residential care'.
301
In R (Limbuela) Act has made the law more accessible and precise, which has been identified as important for the purposes of Article 1. 331 It is also in principle possible that the enormous charges that might currently be imposed on an individual with a high level of need and significant available resources could have been regarded as an 'individual and excessive burden' in the context of a system where those with fewer needs and/or fewer resources are charged less. It appears that, under the current system, some people are at risk of losing up to 80% of their assets in paying for care. 332 The cap on care costs, whatever its difficulties, would make the possibility of an arguable 'individual and excessive burden' less likely, as would the increased generosity of the means testing limits.
Arguments based on inheritance, however, would always have been somewhat problematic for the purposes of the Convention, given that an inheritance is not a 'possession' for the purposes of Article 1 following Markcx v Belgium, although it was recognized that 'the right to dispose of one's property constitutes a traditional and fundamental aspect of the right of property'. 333 In any case, it could be argued that, following Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council v Wallbank, 334 an heir who 'acquires' a home subject to a social care charge acquires property that is already burdened (and in fact will not acquire a fully-fledged property right until the estate is duly administered), 335 so that he cannot use Article 1 of the First Protocol because that would confer property-related rights that did not already exist. Final Version to be published in (2016) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies.
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that LAs struggle more to meet the needs of those who literally cannot afford to pay for their care, although only a minority are likely reach the cap and the emphasis is on ensuring that 'everyone will benefit from knowing that they will be covered'. 347 It is still significant that extra care paid for by a wealthier person would not contribute to progress towards the cap if the needs were not considered eligible or an LA would have spent less in meeting eligible needs. The fact remains that the new system could fail fully to meet the needs of a social care recipient in a manner consistent with her dignity and charge her for the privilege of enduring that failure. Unless Baroness Hale's approach is somehow resurrected, taken seriously and applied to Article 8, the ECHR can do little to help.
Conclusions
Amongst its analysis of the detail of the new social care legislation, and the regulations and guidance required to implement it, this article raises difficult questions about the proper role of a doctrinal legal scholar in evaluating law that is so inherently bound up with politics, social policy and public expenditure, notwithstanding the fact that social care raises important issues for those concerned with black-letter property law. The article has attempted to evaluate the Care Act against the benchmark of the ECHR. That evaluation has demonstrated the limitations of such an approach in the context of the most influential human rights treaty within English Law. The reality is that the old system was systemically consistent with the ECHR (even if there could be breaches in individual cases) as regards its protection of both the right to respect for private life and that to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, particularly given the deferential approach of the ECtHR on matters such as health and social care. The new system heralded by the Care Act will make compatibility more likely if fully implemented, but viewed from a human rights perspective its 347 Hopkins and Laurie (n 4) 131.
impact appears limited in some respects even though it has formally extended the human rights protection offered to social care recipients in others. The combined effect of LA discretion, underinvestment and the imposition of asset-based welfare caused by the continuing liability to pay for social care (and not health care, for example) using one's own property still supports the claim that the normative rights and the inherent dignity of some individuals are prejudiced by the system, although the decline in home ownership may ultimately reduce the scope for the Act to interfere with property rights for generations to come. 
